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Abstract
The trajectory of Edmund Husserl’s thought on “phantasy” points toward a de-emphasis 
of both perception and presence as tools for understanding the imagination. I will argue, 
however, that Husserl’s treatment of “phantasy” is ultimately deficient inasmuch as it 
focuses on the epistemological function of the imagination, while neglecting its ontological 
significance. As a corrective, I will develop an ontological concept of imagination by draw-
ing on the work of the 12th century Sufi philosopher, Ibn al-‘Arabi.  It will be shown that 
the imagination is a constitutive feature of both the world (as the horizon of possibility) 
and all knowledge of the world (as an intentional relationship); it is both ontologically and 
epistemologically essential. 
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I. Introduction
If imagination is, as Paul Ricoeur put it, “the capacity for letting new worlds shape our understanding of ourselves,” then it is an indispensible 
aspect of religious consciousness.1 Indeed, medieval Jewish, Christian, and 
Muslim thinkers were explicit about the role of the imagination in religious 
practice. So the Zohar’s commentary on Psalm 31:23 states, “[God] is known 
and grasped to the degree that one opens the gates of imagination! The 
capacity to connect with the spirit of wisdom, to imagine in one’s heart-
1  Paul Ricoeur, “Metaphor and the Central Problem of Hermeneutics,” trans. J. B. Thompson 
in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 181. 
Earlier versions of this essay were presented at meetings of the Western North Carolina 
Community of Continental Philosophers and the International Network in Philosophy of 
Religion. 
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mind—this is how God becomes known.”2 Similarly, the Sufi philosopher 
Ibn al-‘Arabi argues that “nothing has truly gained possession of the [Divine] 
Form except imagination.”3 And Thomas Aquinas claims that the imaginatio 
is one of four inner senses that may “express divine things better than those 
[images] do which we receive from sensible objects.”4 Far from being whim-
sical, fantastic, or juvenile, the imagination is regarded as a primary way of 
knowing God, or connecting the transcendent and the immanent—at least 
when it is used correctly.5 Yet the nature and function of the imagination 
is difficult to discern. It is tempting to think that imagination derives from 
perception; however, the boundaries between perception and imagination 
are not always clear. We cannot assume that imagination functions primarily 
to modify stable underlying perceptions, for imagination also affects our 
basic perceptions. In the Catholic liturgy, for example, the bread and wine is 
not just imagined to be the body and blood of Christ; it is perceived as such. 
When a worshipper exits the church, she does not imagine that the beggar 
on the corner is a fellow child of God; rather, she perceives the beggar as a 
brother. When she looks at the natural world, she perceives it as a creation 
that demands care and attention. In other words, the boundary between 
imagination and perception—however we define those terms—is somewhat 
fuzzy. This raises a significant phenomenological problem: What role does 
the imagination play in phenomenal constitution? 
This question is extremely important for a phenomenological under-
standing of religious life and practice, but it is far more complicated than 
it first appears. After decades of phenomenological investigations into 
“phantasy,” Edmund Husserl cautioned that, “we need to reflect carefully 
here. Determining the essence of phantasy is a great problem.”6 It is not clear 
to me that Husserl ever settled on a satisfactory understanding of fantasy. 
Nonetheless, the trajectory of Husserl’s thought is suggestive. In the first 
section of this essay, I will survey three concepts of imagination based on 
three theories of consciousness in Husserl’s work: 1) the image theory; 2) 
the content-apprehension schema; and 3) time consciousness (or absolute 
consciousness). I will argue that Husserl focuses on the epistemological 
2  Daniel Chanan Matt, Zohar: The Book of Enlightenment (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 
1983), 66.
3  Ibn al-‘Arabi, Futūhāt al-makkiyya, IV 325.2. As quoted in William Chittick, The Sufi Path 
of Knowledge (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), 115f.
4  Summa Theologia, 1.12.13. For a concise overview of Aquinas’ concept of imaginatio, 
see F.C. Bauerschmidt, “Imagination and Theology in Thomas Aquinas,” Louvain Studies 
34 (2009-10): 169-184.
5  Medieval thinkers often caution against the misuse of the imagination. After all, we can 
imagine a just world as easily as an unjust world. For an excellent historical/ genealogical 
overview of “imagination,” see Richard Kearney, The Wake of the Imagination (New York: 
Routledge, 1988). 
6  Edmund Husserl, Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, trans. John B. Brough 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 671.
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function of the imagination, while neglecting its ontological significance. 
In the second section, I will develop an ontological concept of imagination 
by drawing on the work of the 12th century Sufi philosopher, Ibn al-‘Arabi. 
Ultimately, imagination is a constitutive feature of both the world (as the 
horizon of possibility) and all knowledge of the world (as an intentional 
relationship); it is both ontologically and epistemologically essential. 
II. Husserl on fantasy, image theory,  
and representation
Before examining the evolution of Husserl’s thoughts on fantasy, it will 
be helpful to get a general sense of the distinction between perception and 
fantasy. In any act of perception, memory, or anticipation, I am conscious 
of events as existing now, as having existed in the past, or as coming to 
exist in the future, respectively. Yet fantasy is wholly different inasmuch 
as the positing of existence, which is fundamental to perception, memory, 
and anticipation is not involved. As Husserl puts it, “Phantasying is set in 
opposition to perceiving and to the intuitive positing of past and future 
as true; in short to all acts that posit something individual and concrete as 
existing.”7 In fantasy, I do not assume that the fantasy object has ever or 
will ever exist. If I imagine a blue unicorn, the act of imagining involves an 
awareness that I am not positing the existence of a blue unicorn. Of course, 
I can fantasize about things that do actually exist—a different arrangement 
of this room, for example—but even so, the object of my fantasy is present 
to me as something different from my actual perception of existence: “If I 
make the shift [from perception] into phantasy, I have the consciousness of 
passing over into a null world. What is re-presented is does not exist: it nei-
ther exists now nor has existed now will be coming into existence.”8 Thus 
Husserl distinguishes two modes of presentation: “perceptual presentation” 
and “phantasy presentation.” In both cases, a phenomenon is present to 
consciousness, but perceptual presentation posits existence while phantasy 
presentation does not. 
Husserl differentiates phantasy presentation from perceptual presen-
tation in two main ways: First, he distinguishes between memory, which 
reproduces an actual experience “as it were” or as it happened in the past, 
and phantasy, which produces an experience “as if” it were. In an unmod-
ified memory—that is to say, a memory that does not transform what is 
7  Ibid., 4.
8  Ibid., 360. Brough translates Vergegenwaertigung as “re-presentation,” while F. Kersten 
(translator of Ideas I) translates it as “presentiation.” Neither is entirely satisfactory: 
“re-presentation” implies a sort of temporal repetition (copy v. original) in a way that 
Vergegenwaertigung does not; “presentiation” is a neologism and, as such, is not all that 
helpful. The Langenscheidt dictionary translates it as ‘visualization,’ but the emphasis on 
vision is not entirely right either. 
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remembered—consciousness reproduces a previous experience in the tem-
poral mode of “as it were.” So, for instance, if I remember the experience 
of driving in the car with my grandfather, that experience is present to me 
now, but in the temporal mode of “as it were” or “as having happened.” I 
can also phantasize about that memory: Suppose I imagine that my grand-
father drove a red Corvette rather than a white Oldsmobile. In that case, the 
experience is once again manifest to me, but phantasy adds a new mode of 
intentionality: the “as-if,” which modifies the temporal mode of the mem-
ory. So the experience is now present in the mode of “as if it were”—as if 
my grandfather had driven a red Corvette. The same logic applies to future 
experiences. If I expect the sun to rise tomorrow, that experience is present 
to me in the mode of “as it will be.” If I phantasize about that expectation 
(What if the sun turns blue when it rises tomorrow?), the temporal mode 
shifts to something like “as if it would be.” In both cases, phantasy occurs 
in the mode of “as-if.” As Husserl puts it, “In lively intuition we ‘behold’ 
centaurs, water nymphs, etc.; they stand before us, depart, present them-
selves from this side and that, sing and dance, and so on. All, however, in 
the mode of the ‘as-if’; and this mode saturates all of the temporal modes 
and with them also content, which is content only in temporal modes.”9 
The second way that Husserl differentiates phantasy presentation from 
perceptual presentation has to do with the nature of the experience of phan-
tasy. If I imagine that I am driving with my grandfather in a red Corvette, 
I am experiencing something—I am thinking, creating a mental image, 
wondering “what if,” and so forth—but the experience does not rise to 
the level of normal perceptual experience in which a phenomenal object is 
actually given. One difference between the two experiences is that phantasies 
are protean, while actual perception is not. That is to say, phantasies can 
change at any moment, while perception is stable from one moment to the 
next. Another difference is that phantasy objects have no identity across 
time and space.10 The red Corvette I fantasize about cannot be said in any 
meaningful sense to be identical to the one that you fantasize about, but if we 
both perceive a red Corvette driving by, then the object of our perceptions 
is identical. Husserl therefore speaks of fantasy as a “quasi-intuiting” act 
or “quasi-experience,” in which one is conscious of the fantasy object as a 
figment as opposed to something actual.
Husserl’s notions of “as-if” and “quasi-experience” remain more-or-less 
consistent throughout his corpus, but the role assigned to fantasy in the 
9  Ibid. 606.
10  In his early work, Husserl conflates phantasy and possibility and therefore claims 
that different phantasy objects can be identical inasmuch as they point to the same possible 
object. He later distinguishes between phantasy and possibility because possibility gestures 
toward existence while phantasy has nothing to do with existence. A phantasy can become 
a possibility if one reflects on the potential existence of the phantasy object, but pure phan-
tasy is not equivalent to possibility. Accordingly, in his later work, Husserl maintains that 
phantasies have no identity across space and time.
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process of constitution varies greatly depending on the concept of conscious-
ness involved. We can discern three theories of consciousness at work in 
Husserl’s explanation of fantasy: first, the “image theory” of consciousness; 
second, the “content-apprehension schema” of consciousness, and third, 
“time consciousness” (or “absolute consciousness”).11 Let us consider each 
in turn. 
The image theory of consciousness assumes that representations in the 
mind (e.g., memories, fantasies, and so forth) work much like a painting 
hanging on a gallery wall. First, there is the image itself—the physical 
painting on the wall, about which we might say that it “hangs askew, is 
torn, and so forth.”12 Then there is the image object, which is the image that 
appears on the painting. So, for instance, the Mona Lisa is an image that has 
physical characteristics (e.g., size, type of paint, position on the wall at the 
Louvre); it also depicts an image of woman, but that image differs from the 
actual woman in terms of its size, coloring, and so forth. Presumably the 
actual Lisa was not the same size as the image in the painting! So the image 
object (that is, the depiction) is different from the image subject (that is, the 
depicted thing)—in this case, the actual woman, Lisa Gherardini.  
While the physical image and image subject are both real things, Husserl 
argues the image object is not: “[The] image object is naturally not a part 
or side of the physical image—not, say, the color distributed on the paper 
in such and such a way. The semblance thing is a three-dimensional body 
with color spread over the body; it is not identical with the surface of the 
paper and its chromatic gradation of tints.”13 Think of it this way: When 
we ask whether an image is a good depiction of its subject, we are not 
asking whether the bare physical matter of the image matches its subject. 
That would be absurd. The Mona Lisa is a two-dimensional painting, after 
all, while Lisa Gherardini is a three-dimensional flesh-and-blood person. 
Rather, we are asking whether the image object (the depiction) matches the 
image subject (the depicted), but the image object cannot really exist, for 
only the physical painting and the object depicted exist! In other words, 
the image object is a construct—an “interpreting act”—that represents the 
image subject, mediating between what actually appears (the physical 
image) and what does not (the image subject). Similarly, Husserl argues that 
fantasy and memory are modes of representational consciousness, in which 
mental images represent an object that is absent—for instance, a previous 
experience or non-existent object. Alternately, in perception, the image 
object and subject coincide in the present. On this model, the fundamental 
11  Husserl draws a distinction between the image theory and representational theory of 
consciousness. I would further differentiate between theories of representation that reflect 
Husserl’s earlier static conception of consciousness and those that reflect his later genetic 
conception of consciousness.
12  Ibid., 118.
13  Ibid., 118.
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distinction between perception and fantasy “is between presentation and 
representation.”14  
By 1905, Husserl begins to question the image theory of consciousness. 
In the case of fantasy, he argues that it would be impossible to distinguish 
between an image object and an image subject. If I imagine a blue unicorn, 
for example, the image I have does not represent another reality, like a real 
blue unicorn or some other depicted object that would serve as an image 
subject. As Husserl puts it, “We do indeed have an appearance of an object 
in phantasy presentation, but no an appearance of something present by 
means of which the appearance of something not present would come 
about.”15 In other words, a fantasy does not point beyond itself in the same 
way that a depicting image does; rather, fantasy objects are available to 
consciousness in a simple, straightforward manner much like perceptual 
objects. The difference is that perceptions are objectivated as present while 
fantasies are objectivated as non-present; both are, however, “ultimate 
mode[s] of intuitive objectivation.”16 Husserl concludes than the analogy 
between consciousness and images cannot accurately account for the nature 
and function of fantasy. So much for the image theory.
The second theory of consciousness that features in Husserl’s analysis of 
fantasy is the “content-apprehension schema.”17 On this view, consciousness 
consists of “primary contents” (e.g., color-data, tone-data, touch-data) and 
intentional apprehensions that give form to those contents—“a stuff-stra-
tum and a noetic stratum.”18 Take, for instance, the perception of my desk. 
The perception consists of various data, which are immanent sensory con-
tents—color-data like brownness and touch-data like smoothness. These 
immanent data become “representants” of a phenomenal object through 
an intentional apprehension, resulting in the intentional object—namely, 
my desk. On this view, the difference between perception and fantasy has 
to do with the mode of apprehension applied to various types of contents. 
When I perceive my desk, “brown” and “smooth” sensations undergo a 
perceptual apprehension resulting in a perceptual object: my desk. If I were 
to fantasize about my desk (I wish it had the ability to clean itself off!), then 
I would re-present those sensory components (phantasms) by means of a 
“phantasy apprehension,” which would result in a fantasy object.
Husserl eventually rejected the “content-apprehension schema” as part 
of a broader turn from static phenomenology, which offered a schematic 
14  Ibid., 113.
15  Ibid., 90.
16  Ibid., 93.
17  The distinction between content of apprehension and apprehension is equivalent to 
the distinction between hylē and morphē in Ideas I, which Husserl traces back to his ear-
liest work, Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891). See Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy I, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1983), 203-207.
18  Husserl, Ideas I, 207.
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view of the constitution of phenomenal objects, to genetic phenomenol-
ogy, which looked in greater detail at the formation of transcendental sub-
jectivity. In the content-apprehension schema, the immanent contents of 
consciousness are simply there—present and waiting to be animated by a 
perceptual or phantasy apprehension. Yet the defining feature of phantasy is 
“non-presence.” How is it that consciousness can bestow upon immanently 
present contents the characteristic of non-presence? John Brough puts it well: 
“If I experience the phantasm as an immanent content present and there 
itself, how could an apprehension render it not present and not there itself? 
It is simply not tenable that a present phantasm could undergo a ‘discred-
iting modification’ into something that is not present.”19 Additionally, the 
content-apprehension schema cannot explain the origin of the contents of 
consciousness. How did those contents get there in the first place? Husserl 
puts the objection as follows: 
In the case of perception understood as concrete experience, we do not 
first of all have a color as content of apprehension and then the charac-
teristic of apprehension that produces the appearance. And likewise in 
the case of phantasy we do not again have a color as content of apprehen-
sion and then a changed apprehension, the apprehension that produces 
the phantasy appearance. On the contrary: “Consciousness” consists of 
consciousness through and through, and the sensation as well as the 
phantasm is already “consciousness.”20
Both contents and apprehensions are aspects of consciousness and, there-
fore, a new analysis of consciousness is necessary. 
The “genetic” phenomenology that emerges in Formal and Transcendental 
Logic and the Crisis texts points to a deeper, absolute stratum of conscious 
life, which experiences but is not itself experienced, and which constitutes 
phenomenal objects but is not itself an object. On this view of conscious-
ness, all of the elements of constituting activity (subject, object, content, 
form, temporality, perception, fantasy, and so forth) are seen as internal 
components of “absolute” consciousness, the defining feature of which is 
time consciousness. 
Husserl argues that absolute consciousness is essentially a temporal flow, 
from the now-phase of an experience forward to consciousness of future 
phases (protention) and backward to the consciousness of past experiences 
(retention). Every actual experience occurs within the temporal flow of con-
sciousness and involves all three phases: “every phenomenon of original 
presentation, also involves components of post-presentation [i.e., retention] 
and fore-presentation [i.e., protention].”21 Accordingly, every phenome-
19  John Brough, translator’s introduction to Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), LX.
20  Husserl, Phantasy, Image-Consciousness, and Memory, 265.
21  Ibid., 381.
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non—every experience, whether perception or fantasy—is suffused with the 
absence of future and past. It is, therefore, impossible to separate perception 
from fantasy on the basis of a distinction between presence and absence as 
if perception were the experience of a present object and fantasy were the 
experience of an absent object, for absence colors every experience.
The development of time consciousness results in a major shift in Husserl’s 
understanding of consciousness in general and fantasy in particular, both of 
which he ultimately defines in terms of “impressions” and “reproductions.” 
Husserl identifies impressions as, “experiences in which an originary pres-
ent, an originary now, becomes constituted, or an originary just-having-been 
and yet-to-come.”22 If, for example, I experience my wife walking through 
the door, that experience contains a now-phase inasmuch as she is standing 
before me; a just-having-been phase inasmuch as she came in from outside; 
and a yet-to-come phase as she walks past me to go somewhere else. All 
three phases are part of the original experience or impression. 
If, in an hour or so, I recall what my wife looked like when she entered 
the room, that would be a “reproduction,” which Husserl defines as “expe-
riences in which things of a like kind do indeed become constituted, but 
in such a way that what is constituted is also a re-presentation of a now, 
of a just-past, of a future.”23 Reproduction is a modification of the original 
impression in which the internal consciousness of the original experience 
is reproduced and the object of the experience is re-presented. Husserl is 
clear, however, that reproduction is not the same kind of act as the original 
impression. If this were the case, then my memory of hearing a symphony 
would be a literal echo of that symphony! Rather, reproduction modifies 
the original act of consciousness by transforming it into a re-presentational 
act (rather than the original presentational act). As Brough puts it:
The consciousness of the reproduced act is also internal consciousness, 
but of a new kind. It is not the original internal consciousness through 
which I am aware of an act as present an actually taking place. It is mod-
ified internal consciousness through which I reproduce an act that is not 
actually taking place, that is not there itself.24 
In the case of fantasy (rather than memory), the re-presented object is 
not necessarily something that has been experienced before; rather, fantasy 
reproduces acts of consciousness in the mode of “as-if.” 
For our purposes, it is important to recognize the overall trajectory of 
Husserl’s work on phantasy and memory. On the image theory of conscious-
ness, fantasy was defined based on a model of perception that privileged 
22  Ibid., 381.
23  Ibid., 381.
24  John Bough, translator’s introduction to Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), LXV.
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presence over absence: an absent object (the image subject) could only be 
known through a present object (the image object.) On the content-appre-
hension model, perception and fantasy were viewed as fundamentally 
different based on their contents (sensations v. phantasms) and modes of 
apprehension, but this model retained the emphasis on presence in that 
the contents of consciousness are always “there,” ready to be animated. 
The final model, absolute consciousness, portrayed fantasy as a mode of 
consciousness, separate from perception, defined by the modification of 
impressional experience, which always includes both presence and absence. 
The trajectory of Husserl’s thought is toward a de-emphasis of both percep-
tion and presence as tools for understanding the imagination. 
While Husserl’s mature understanding of fantasy as internal reproduc-
tion is helpful, it is nonetheless problematic. Husserl retains an individual-
ized, Cartesian notion of consciousness, which prevents him from develop-
ing the ontological implications of the Absolute in the way that, say, Martin 
Heidegger or Eugen Fink did. If all consciousness is consciousness, then 
our experience of the world and our orientation toward Being are aspects 
of transcendental subjectivity that need to be examined. Accordingly, for 
Heidegger, “absolute” consciousness leads directly to fundamental ontol-
ogy: “there must be an intrinsic kinship between primordial transcendence 
and the understanding-of-being. They must in the end be one and the 
same.”25 Similarly, Eugen Fink argues that Husserlian phenomenology 
“unthematically presupposes ‘being.’”26 While Fink’s and Heidegger’s 
works are beyond the scope of this paper, the question of ontology is cru-
cial. If absolute consciousness implies something about ontology, then 
Husserl’s analysis of imagination is incomplete to the extent that it leaves 
the ontological dimension of imagination unexamined.
III. Ibn al-‘Arabi’s Ontological Imagination
To address this lacuna in Husserlian thought, let us consider a phenom-
enologically suggestive account of imagination in the work Muhyi al-Din 
Ibn al-‘Arabi, the 12th century Muslim philosopher, whose influence on Islam 
and Sufism in particular has been enormous. While Ibn al-‘Arabi is certainly 
not a proto-phenomenologist, his ontological concept of imagination may 
prove helpful.
For Ibn al-‘Arabi, the imagination functions at both microcosmic (indi-
vidual, personal) and macrocosmic (ontology, creation) levels. At the micro-
cosmic level, imagination has to do with God’s self-disclosure to humans. 
25  Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 136.
26  Ronald Bruzina, Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink: Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology, 
1928-1938 (New Haven: Yale University Press), 132.
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Ibn al-‘Arabi argues that God can take many forms, depending on the 
expectations and capacities of the one perceiving God: “The Self-discloser 
[i.e., God], in respect of what He is in Himself, is One in Entity, while the 
self-disclosures—I mean their forms—are diverse in accordance with the 
diversity of the preparedness of the loci of self-disclosure. The property of 
the divine gifts is the same.”27 God gives godself to be known according 
to the “preparedness” of the knower. This “preparedness” or receptivity 
originates not in the rational faculty, but in the imagination, which alone 
is capable of connecting the sensible (immanent) world to the divine or 
transcendent world: “The world of imagination is the embodied lights that 
signify what is beyond them, for imagination brings intelligible meanings 
down into sensory molds, like knowledge in the form of milk, the Koran 
in the form of a cord, and religion in the form of a fetter.”28
Although Ibn al-‘Arabi’s concept of imagination is explicitly Muslim, 
there are important parallels with Husserl’s idea of fantasy. Much like 
Husserl, Ibn al-‘Arabi argues that the imagination modifies sensations into a 
sort of quasi-experience: “Part of the reality of imagination is that it embod-
ies and gives form to that which is not a body or form, for imagination 
perceives only in this manner. Hence it is a sensation that is non-mani-
fest and bound between the intelligible and the sensible.29 It is, however, 
important not to let modern, or Husserlian, concepts of “imagination” 
restrict our analysis of Ibn al-‘Arabi. We tend to regard the imagination as 
a purely mental, subjective capacity. At the very least, Ibn al-‘Arabi reminds 
us of the broader importance of imagination, for imagination is the human 
capacity that allows us to hope for a better world (ethics, justice), to desire 
greater understanding (science, philosophy), and to know God (theology). 
Imagination is, for Ibn al-‘Arabi, the highest capacity of the human intellect, 
connecting man to God. Moreover, the imagination is not strictly relegated 
to the human mind. Ibn al-‘Arabi speaks of existence itself as an “imaginal 
act” on God’s part; everything apart from God is “imaginal.” Consequently, 
imagination is both epistemological, in that it allows us to know God, and 
ontological, in that it constitutes the essential connection between factual 
and counterfactual worlds. 
At the macrocosmic or ontological level, imagination is a fundamental 
feature of existence. On the one hand, there is God, whose existence is 
necessary (God=Being or “the Real”). On the other hand, there is non-ex-
istence. Everything in-between—the existence of the entire cosmos and all 
knowledge derived from it—exists in a mediated state. Accordingly, Ibn 
al-‘Arabi refers to the cosmos as an isthmus (barzakh) connecting God and 
27  William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge (Albany, NY: Suny, 1989), 92. On God’s 
transmutation into different forms, see ibid., 337. 
28 William Chittick, The Self-disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn Al-‘Arabi’s Cosmology (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1998), 332.
29  Ibid., 332.
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nothingness. This means that everything exists in a paradoxical relation-
ship to God: The cosmos is God (inasmuch as creation reflects the creator) 
and is not God (inasmuch as God transcends the world)—existence is “He/
not-He.” Annemarie Schimmel puts it well: 
God is above all qualities—they are neither He nor other than He—and 
He manifests Himself only by means of the names, not by his essence. 
On the plane of essence, He is inconceivable (transcending concepts) and 
nonexperiential (transcending even non-rational cognition.) That means 
that in their actual existence the creatures are not identical with God, but 
only reflections of his attributes. 30 
The created world is a reflection of God’s attributes, and therefore like 
God, but also unlike God inasmuch as God’s essence utterly transcends 
creation. The paradoxical nature of created existence (ὄντος) also has epis-
temological implications: God cannot be known through rational concepts; 
even non-rational cognition (namely, the imagination) cannot reach God’s 
essence.
To explain the idea of “He/not-He,” Ibn al-‘Arabi typically refers to two 
sources. First, the Quran’s account of God’s action in Muhammad’s victory 
at the Battle of Badr: “You did not slay them, but God slew them, and thou 
threwest not when thou threwest, but God threw” (8:17). Second, a hadith 
about Adam: “While His two hands were closed, God said to Adam, 
‘Choose whichever you like.’ Adam replied, ‘I choose the right hand of 
the Lord, though both hands of my Lord are right and blessed.’ Then God 
opened it, and within it were Adam and His seed. He said, ‘My Lord, what 
are these?’ God replied, ‘These are your seed.’”31  Ibn al-‘Arabi comments 
on these two episodes as follows: 
Adam was in the hand while he was also outside of it. Such also is the 
case in this question: When you consider, you will see that the cosmos is 
with the Real [i.e., God] in this manner. This is a place of bewilderment: 
He/not-He. “You did not throw when you threw, but God threw.”… 
Would that I knew who is the middle, the one who stands between the 
negation—His words “You did not throw”—and the affirmation—His 
words “But He threw.” He is saying, “You are not you when you are 
you, but God is you.32 
In other words, everything that exists apart from God contains within 
itself the paradox of He/not-He—it is both God and not-God. The paradox-
ical nature of existence (and God’s relation to existence) cannot be grasped 
30  Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1975), 267f.
31  Tirmidhi, Tafsir Sura 113, 3. As quoted in Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 114.
32  Ibn al-‘Arabi, Futūhāt al-makkiyya, II 444.13. As quoted in Chittick, The Sufi Path of 
Knowledge, 114f.
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by the rational faculty, which understands meaning “through proofs or a 
priori,” nor can it be grasped by the senses, which understand through 
sense perception. Rather, such paradoxes can be grasped only as “imagi-
nal things,” for only the imagination is capable of giving concrete form to 
contradictory meanings.33 So, for example, I cannot rationally understand 
the idea of an entity that is both dead and not dead, and I certainly cannot 
perceive such a thing in the empirical world, but I am perfectly capable of 
imagining a zombie. Similarly, I cannot understand He/not-He on the basis 
of reason or sense perception, but I can imagine it. As Ibn al-‘Arabi puts it, 
“It is impossible for sense perception or the rational faculty to bring together 
opposites, but it is not impossible for the imagination… Hence nothing has 
truly gained possession of the [Divine] Form except imagination.”34  We 
ultimately encounter God and the world through the imagination. 
IV. Conclusion
Finally, let me translate Ibn al-‘Arabi’s ontological concept of imagination 
into phenomenological terms: The world is the horizon of possibility—every 
action I might take, every decision I make, every hope I have takes place 
within the horizon of the world. The object-world exists for me as an actu-
ality (the stuff really out there) but I relate to it in the mode of possibility or 
freedom, even if my possibilities are constrained by the contours existence. 
Thus we might characterize being-in-the-world as both actuality and pos-
sibility, real and unreal, He/not-He. Furthermore, the possibility inherent 
in being-in-the-world is intrinsically related to imagination. 
Consider, for example, my perception of people outside my office. I can 
consciously modify that perceptual experience through imagination: I can 
imagine that they are purple. I can imagine that they are resources to be 
exploited for my own gain. I can imagine that they are created by God and 
therefore deserve dignity. Imaginative variation allows me to “try out” 
different intentionalities in the mode of re-presentation. Some of those 
fantasies can be modified into possibilities. I cannot make people purple, 
but I can try to exploit them! The “possibility modification” would shift 
pure fantasy, which does not posit existence, into the sphere of Being-in-
the-world. As Husserl puts it, 
33  There is, of course, a difference between a formal contradiction and a paradox. I take 
Ibn al-‘Arabi to mean that the imagination can makes sense of paradoxes, but it is possible 
to make a stronger claim: if imagination exceeds Aristotelian logic, then it need not be 
restrained by the law of non-contradiction. Graham Priest, for instance, argues that paracon-
sistent (non-Aristotelian) logic allows for belief in some contradictions. See Graham Priest, 
“What’s So Bad About Contradictions?” in The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical 
Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 23-40.  
34  Ibn al-‘Arabi, Futūhāt al-makkiyya, IV 325.2. As quoted in Chittick, The Sufi Path of 
Knowledge, 115f.
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What is possible is possibly existent. It can exist; I can “imagine” (make 
the supposition) that it exists. I can shift at any time from mere phanta-
sying into an act of supposing. But in doing so—this belongs precisely 
to the sense of supposing—I necessarily apply what is phantasied to my 
sphere of being (the sphere of what is unmodified, my sphere of belief.)35 
Possibility is therefore a modification of imagination. 
The macrocosmic or ontological implication is that imagination is the 
constitutive source of possibility, which is a defining feature of being-in-
the-world. At the microcosmic level, imagination allows me to “play” with 
various intentionalities through representation. Yet, as Husserl reminds 
us, all consciousness is consciousness: representational and presentational 
acts are both acts of consciousness. The intentionalities that I develop rep-
resentationally can be shifted to presentational acts. I can, for instance, 
imagine that you all are exploitable resources, and I can then perceive you 
that way and treat you accordingly. The intentional habits and variations 
that I develop through reproductive imagination affect the very processes 
of constitution, from their origin in the life-world to their termination in 
phenomenal objects. Ultimately, imagination is a constitutive feature of 
both the world (as ὄντος, the horizon of possibility) and my openness to 
the world (as an intentional relationship); it is epistemologically and onto-
logically essential. As such, Ibn al-‘Arabi’s valorization of the imagination 
is not far off: “He who does not know the status of imagination has no 
knowledge whatsoever.”36
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